May 1st and 2nd |
By May 1, Hooker had approximately 70,000 men concentrated around Chancellorsville. From his Fredericksburg headquarters, Lee decided to violate one of the generally accepted 'Principle's of war' and divide his force in the face of a superior enemy, hoping that aggressive action would allow him to attack and defeat a portion of Hooker's army before it could be fully concentrated against him, it worked. So Lee left behind a brigade and a division at Mayre's heights to contest any assault that came from Union General Sedgwick's corps. Lee ordered Stonewall Jackson to march west and link up with Maj. Richard Anderson, assembling 40,000 men to confront Hooker at Chancellorsville. Providentialy for the Confederates, heavy fog the Rappahannock masked some of these westward movements and Sedgwick chose to wait until he could determine the enemy's intentions.
At the same time General Jackson was marching west to join with Anderson on the morning of May 1, Hooker ordered an advance to the east to strike Anderson, pushing his men out of the impenetrable thickets that characterized the area. Hooker did this because in the wilderness his advantage of Artillery would be minimized. Despite being in a potentially favorable situation, Hooker halted his brief offensive. His actions may have demonstrated his lack of confidence in handling the complex actions of such a large organization for the first time (he had been an effective and aggressive division and corps commander in previous battles), but he had also decided before beginning the campaign that he would fight the battle defensively, forcing Lee, with his small army, to attack Hooker's larger one. Lee then prepared for the attack.
For Lee's attack to work, three things had to happen. First, Jackson had to make a 12-mile (19 km) march via roundabout roads to reach the Union right, and he had to do it undetected. Second, Lee had to hope that Hooker stayed tamely on the defensive. Third, Early would have to keep Sedgwick bottled up in Fredericksburg. And when Jackson launched his attack, he had to hope that the Union forces were unprepared.
May 3rd |
May 4th |
Sedgwick, as it turned out, was as strong on the defensive as he was weak on the attack, and he stood his ground that day before withdrawing back across the Rappahannock at Banks's Ford during the pre-dawn hours of May 5. This was another miscommunication between him and Hooker; the commanding general had wanted Sedgwick to hold Banks's Ford, so that Hooker could withdraw from the Chancellorsville area and re-cross the river at Banks's to fight again. When he learned that Sedgwick had retreated back over the river, Hooker felt he was out of options to save the campaign, and on the night of May 5–6, he also withdrew back across the river.
In the end Jackson was dead after taking friendly fire then being dropped on a root which punctured his lung. Jackson then contracted Pneumonia. 13,000 casualties for the Confederates and 17,000 for the Federals.
1 comment:
Well done!
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